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Abstract—This paper studies the private key generation of
a cooperative pairwise-independent network (PIN) with M + 2
terminals (Alice, Bob and M relays), M ≥ 2. In this PIN,
the correlated sources observed by every pair of terminals are
independent of those sources observed by any other pair of
terminal. All the terminals can communicate with each other over
a public channel which is also observed by Eve noiselessly. The
objective is to generate a private key between Alice and Bob under
the help of the M relays; such a private key needs to be protected
not only from Eve but also from individual relays simultaneously.
The private key capacity of this PIN model is established, whose
lower bound is obtained by proposing a novel random binning
(RB) based key generation algorithm, and the upper bound is
obtained based on the construction of M enhanced source models.
The two bounds are shown to be exactly the same. Then, we
consider a cooperative wireless network and use the estimates of
fading channels to generate private keys. It has been shown that
the proposed RB-based algorithm can achieve a multiplexing gain
M − 1, an improvement in comparison with the existing XOR-
based algorithm whose achievable multiplexing gain is ⌊M⌋/2.
Index Terms—PIN model, Private key capacity, Multiplexing
gain
I. INTRODUCTION
The pairwise-independent network (PIN) was introduced in
[1] for secret key generation. Since then, many other related
works have also investigated a variety of PIN models (e.g., [2]–
[4]), and each of them aimed to find the secret key capacity of
a particular PIN model. The PIN model is actually a special
case of the multi-terminal “source model” [5], [6], in which
the correlated sources observed by every pair of terminals are
independent of those sources observed by any other pair of
terminal. Note that the so-call “source model” was first studied
by Ahlswede and Csisa´r for generating secret keys between
two terminals using their correlative observations and public
transmissions [7].
In recent years, the PIN model has been applied to practical
wireless communication networks for key generation. Based
on channel reciprocity, the correlated source observations in a
PIN model can be obtained via estimating the wireless fading
channels associated with legitimate terminals. This is because
all the wireless channels in a network are mutually independent
as long as the terminals are half-wavelength away from each
other [8]. This physical layer (PHY) security approach has been
recognized as a promising solution for generating secret key
in recent years (e.g., [9]–[12]).
Existing works have demonstrated that user cooperation can
effectively enlarge the key capacity by introducing additional
helper nodes for cooperative key generation [5], [11], [12].
The work in [5] first studied cooperative key generation
(including the generation of secret keys and private keys)
in a single-helper discrete memoryless source (DMS) model,
where the private key needs to be protected not only from
the eavesdropper but also from all the helper node. The works
in [11], [12] utilized estimates of wireless channels for the
key generation in cooperative wireless networks, in which the
relay nodes provide additional resources of wireless fading
channels. In [11], a relay-assisted algorithm was proposed to
enhance the secret key rate for the scenario without secrecy
constraints at relays, and then an XOR-based algorithm was
proposed to generate a relay-oblivious key, (i.e., private key).
In [12], a multi-antenna relay was considered to help the
legitimate terminals to generate a secret key, and then the
optimal attacker’s strategy was characterized to minimize the
secret key rate when Eve is an active attacker.
The problem of private key generation is investigated in this
paper. We consider a particular cooperative PIN model with
M + 2 terminals (Alice, Bob, M relays) and an eavesdropper
(Eve), where M ≥ 2. Under the help of relays, Alice and Bob
wish to establish a private key which should be protected from
not only Eve but also from individual relays simultaneously.
One of the main contributions of this paper is to find the
private key capacity of this PIN model. To obtain the lower
bound, we propose a novel algorithm for generating the private
key. Specifically, using the observations at relays and the
transmissions over the public channel, Alice and Bob first
agree on M common messages, each of which is open to
a certain relay. Then a random binning process is adopted
in the key distillation step to map these insecure common
messages into a private key. Such an algorithm is termed as
the “RB-based algorithm” for simplicity. On the other hand,
the upper bound of the private key capacity is obtained by
considering M enhanced source models, each of which relaxes
the secrecy constraints on some relays, and assumes that the
relay observations are known by Alice or Bob in advance. Such
an upper bound is tight and matches with the lower bound.
The proposed RB-based private key generation algorithm
in the PIN model can be extended to more practical wire-
less communications. In particular, we consider a cooperative
wireless network, in which Alice, Bob and the M relays
use estimates of wireless channels as the correlative source
observations. It is assumed that Alice and Bob are far away
from each other, so there does not exist the direct link between
Alice and Bob. Compared to the XOR-based algorithm in [11]
whose multiplexing gain is ⌊M⌋/2 for the considered wireless
network, the proposed RB-based algorithm achieves a larger
multiplexing gain M − 1.
II. PAIRWISE INDEPENDENT NETWORK MODEL
Consider a DMS model, where Alice and Bob, with the help
of M ≥ 2 relays, wish to establish a private key that needs to
be protected from Eve and individual relays simultaneously. All
2relays are assumed to be curious but honest: they will comply
with the proposed transmission schemes for helping Alice and
Bob to generate a key, but would also try to intercept the key
information if they can [11]. The nodes can communicate to
each other over a noiseless public channel whose capacity is
infinite, but the transmitted information over the public channel
is also available to Eve noiselessly. Eve is passive in the sense
that it only receives but not transmits information.
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Fig. 1. The considered cooperative PIN model with M relays.
For ∀m ∈ {1, · · · ,M}, let Ym,A and YA,m denote the cor-
relative source observations at Alice and relay m, respectively.
Ym,B and YB,m denote the correlative source observations at
Bob and relay m, respectively. Specifically, Alice observes n
i.i.d. repetitions of random variable XA = (Y1,A, · · · , YM,A),
denoted by XnA = (Y n1,A, · · · , Y nM,A); Bob observes n i.i.d.
repetitions of random variable XB = (Y1,B , · · · , YM,B),
denoted by XnB = (Y n1,B, · · · , Y nM,B); relay m observes n i.i.d.
repetitions of random variable Xm = (YA,m, YB,m), denoted
by Xnm = (Y nA,m, Y nB,m). This DMS model is a PIN in the
sense that [1]
I(Yi,α, Yα,i; {Yj,β, Yβ,j : (j, β) 6= (i, α)}) = 0,
for i, j ∈ {1, · · · ,M};α, β ∈ {A,B}. (1)
This means that Alice and relay m have access to a pair
(Ym,A, YA,m) which is independent of any other pair of source
observations, so is (Ym,B, YB,m). Note that there does not exist
correlated source observations between Alice and Bob, the
private key can be generated only via the help from the relays.
Moreover, we do not consider correlated sources observed by
any pair of relays, since the common randomness shared by
any pair of relays cannot contribute to the private key rate.
More definitions are given as follows.
• Without loss of generality, assume that the nodes use the
public channel to communicate in a round robin fashion
over q rounds. Let 1 ≤ l ≤ q and 1 ≤ m ≤ M .
Specifically, relay m transmits during rounds l that satisfy
l mod (M+2) = m; Alice transmits during rounds l that
satisfy l mod (M + 2) = M + 1; Bob transmits during
rounds l that satisfy l mod (M + 2) = 0.
• A (2nR˜1 , · · · , 2nR˜q ) code for the cooperative key gener-
ation problem consists of :
(i) M + 2 randomized encoders, one for each node.
In rounds l satisfying l mod (M + 2) = m, relay m
generates an index Fl ∈ {1, · · · , 2nR˜l} according to
p(fl|xnm, f
l−1); in rounds l satisfying l mod (M +2) =
M + 1, Alice generates an index Fl ∈ {1, · · · , 2nR˜l}
according to p(fl|xnA, f l−1); in rounds l satisfying l
mod (M + 2) = 0, Bob generates an index Fl ∈
{1, · · · , 2nR˜l} according to p(fl|xnB, f l−1).
(ii) Two decoders, one for Alice (decoder 1) and the
other for Bob (decoder 2). After receiving the q rounds
of transmissions (i.e., F q = {F1, · · · , Fq}) over the public
channel, decoder 1 generates a random key KA according
to KA = KA(XnA, F
q); Decoder 2 generates a random
key KB according to KB = KB(XnB , F q).
• A private key rate R is said to be achievable if there exists
a (2nR˜1 , · · · , 2nR˜q ) code such that
Pr(KA 6= KB) ≤ ǫ, (2)
1
n
H(KA) ≥ R− ǫ, (3)
1
n
H(KA) ≥
1
n
log |KA| − ǫ, (4)
1
n
I(KA;X
n
m, F
q) ≤ ǫ, for ∀m ∈ {1, · · · ,M}, (5)
where |KA| denotes the size of the alphabet of the key
KA. Note that the secrecy constraints in (5) implies that
the relays are assumed to be non-colluding.
• The private key capacity CK is the supremum of all
achievable rates R. C(d)K is used to denote the private key
capacity with deterministic encoding and key generation
functions. According to [5], C(d)K = CK , which means
that randomization is useless for key generation in the
addressed source model.
III. PRIVATE KEY CAPACITY OF THE PIN MODEL
For simplicity, we first define
Ii = min {I(Yi,A;YA,i), I(Yi,B ;YB,i)} , ∀i ∈ {1, · · · ,M}.
(6)
Furthermore, these parameters are ordered according to I(1) ≤
I(2) ≤ · · · ≤ I(M). Then the private key capacity for the
considered scenario is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: For the considered PIN model with M relays,
the private key capacity is given by
CK =
M∑
i=1
Ii − max
m∈{1,··· ,M}
Im (7)
=
M−1∑
i=1
I(i). (8)
Proof: The achievability part is proved by a novel RB-
based key generation algorithm that is based on two steps: key
agreement and key distillation. In the key agreement step, Alice
and Bob can agree on M common messages, each of which is
revealed to a certain relay. In the private key distillation step,
these common messages will be mapped into the final private
key via a RB-based private-key codebook.
The converse part is proved by deriving the upper bounds
of M symmetric enhanced channels. Each of these enhanced
channels relaxes the secrecy constraints and assumes Alice
and Bob to be genie-aided (i.e., knowing part of the sources
observed by the relays).
The details of the proof will be provided as follows.
3A. Proof of Achievability
Algorithm 1 briefly shows the achievable scheme that is
based on two steps: key agreement and key distillation. Let
RA,i = I(YA,i, Yi,A) − ǫ, RB,i = I(YB,i, Yi,B) − ǫ for
1 ≤ i ≤ M ; Ri = min{Ri,A, Ri,B} = Ii − ǫ, and they
are ordered according to R(1) ≤ · · · ≤ R(M). Besides,
Rkey =
∑M−1
i=1 R(i).
Algorithm 1: Algorithm of Relay-oblivious Key Generation
Step 1: Key Agreement:
• Alice and Relay i agree on a pairwise key WA,i from
the correlated observations (Y ni,A, Y nA,i); Bob and Relay
i agree on a pairwise key WB,i from the correlated
observations (Y ni,B , Y nB,i), i = 1, · · ·M .
• Relay i sends WA,i ⊕ WB,i over the public channel,
so Alice and Bob can obtain both WA,i and WB,i,
i = 1, · · ·M . Then they will choose the one with a smaller
size as the common message, denoted as Wi ∈ Wi.
Step 2: Key Distillation:
• In advance, randomly grouped all the sequences wM in
WM into 2n(Rkey−ǫ) bins each with equal amount of
codewords. All the other nodes also know this private-
key codebook.
• Alice and Bob find the sequence WM = (W1, · · · ,WM )
in the RB based private-key codebook, and choose its bin
number as the final private key.
1) Key Agreement: In the key agreement step, Alice and
Bob will agree on M common messages.
First, each relay i and Alice agree on a pairwise key WA,i
using their correlated sources (Y nA,i, Y ni,A); each relay and
Bob agree on a pairwise key using their correlated sources
(Y nB,i, Y
n
i,B). According to the standard techniques [7] [2], each
pairwise key WA,i (WB,i) is generated using Slepian-Wolf
coding and public transmission FA,i (FB,i). Moreover, the
pairwise keys WA,i and WB,i have the following properties
[1], [2]:
i) They can achieve the rates RA,i and RB,i, respectively;
ii) They are uniformly distributed and can be decoded by
both Alice and Bob correctly;
iii) The pairs {(Wα,i, Fα,i)α∈{A,B},i∈{1,··· ,M}} are mutually
independent, due to the definitions of the PIN model.
Second, each relay i sends out WA,i⊕WB,i over the public
channel, so Alice and Bob can obtain both the two pairwise
keys, and choose the one with a smaller size as the common
message, denoted as Wi. Hence the rate of each common
message Wi is Ri. According to [11],
1
n
I(W1, · · · ,WM ;F
q) ≤ ǫ1. (9)
2) Key Distillation: In the key distillation step, both Alice
and Bob map all the insecure common messages assembled
from the key agreement step into the unique codeword in the
private-key codebook, and set the bin number of this codeword
as the final private key. Note that such a private-key codebook
is generated based on random binning, so it provides necessary
randomness such that the bin number is secret from all the
relays and Eve.
Remark 1: The main difference between the proposed al-
gorithm and the one in [11] lies in the key distillation step:
the former is based on the RB process and the latter is based
on an XOR process. In [11], Alice and Bob concatenate
(W1 ⊕W2, · · · ,WM−1 ⊕WM ) as the final private key in the
key distillation step. Here M is assumed to be even.
We will provide more details of the RB-based codebook in
the following.
Codebook Generation: Let wi ∈ Wi = {1, · · · , 2nRi},
wM = (w1, · · · , wM ). Then, based on the concept of ran-
dom binning, the private-key codebook can be constructed.
Specifically, randomly and uniformly partition all the elements
wM in set WM = W1 × W2 × · · · × WM into 2n(Rkey−ǫ)
bins each with 2n(R(M)+ǫ) codewords. So each codeword wM
can be indexed as wM (k, k˜), where k ∈ {1, · · · , 2n(Rkey−ǫ)},
k˜ ∈ {1, · · · , 2n(R(M)+ǫ)}. Fig. 2 illustrates the binning assign-
ment for the private-key codebook, denoted by C, that is known
by all nodes (including Eve).
bin 1
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Fig. 2. The binning assignment for the private-key codebook, where wM =
(w1, · · · , wM ) ∈ W
M
, wi ∈ {1, · · · , 2
nRi}.
Decoding and key generation: Based on the common
messages collected in the key agreement step, Alice and
Bob can find their corresponding indices in the private-key
codebook. Specifically, knowing (W1, · · · ,WM ), Alice finds
the index pair (k, k˜) from the private-key codebook such that
wM (k, k˜) = (W1, · · · ,WM ). Then, it sets its key KA = k.
Similarly, Bob can also correctly find the key KB = k. Since
the error probability of the event that Alice and Bob share
the same (W1, · · · ,WM ) is insignificant, the error probability
P (KA 6= KB) is arbitrarily small as n→∞.
Analysis of the key rate: Since the private-key codebook
is based on the random binning process, KA is uniformly
distributed over {1, · · · , 2n(Rkey−ǫ)} averaged over the code-
book (i.e., C). Therefore, it can be obviously obtained that
H(KA|C) = n(Rkey − ǫ).
Analysis of the secrecy constraints: For ∀m ∈
{1, · · · ,M}, we will prove that the generated private key is
secret from relay m. Define WM = (W1, · · · ,WM ). Then,
4averaged over C, we have
I(KA;F
q, Xnm|C)
(a)
≤ I(KA;F
q,Wm|C)
≤ I(KA;Wm|C) + I(KA,W
M ;F q|Wm, C)
(b)
≤ I(KA;Wm|C) + nǫ1
= I(KA;Wm|C) + nǫ1. (10)
where (a) is due to the fact that Xnm − (Wm, F q) − KA is
a Markov chain; (b) is due to (9) and the fact that KA is
determined by WM for a given codebook. Furthermore,
I(KA;Wm|C)=I(KA,W
M ;Wm|C)−I(W
M ;Wm|KA, C)
=I(WM ;Wm|C)−H(W
M |KA, C)+H(W
M |Wm,KA, C)
=H(Wm|C)−H(W
M |KA,C)+H(W
M |Wm,KA,C). (11)
For the first term, obviously we have
H(Wm|C) = nRm. (12)
Since H(Wi|C) = nRi, we have H(WM |C) = n
∑M
i=1 R(i).
So the second term can be obtained as
H(WM |KA, C) = H(W
M |C) +H(KA|W
M , C)−H(KA|C)
= H(WM |C)−H(KA|C)
= n
M∑
i=1
R(i) − n(Rkey − ǫ)
= n(R(M) + ǫ). (13)
The third term is bounded in the following lemma.
Lemma 2: When R(M) = max{R1, · · · , RM} and n is
sufficiently large,
H(WM |Wm,KA, C) ≤ n(R(M) −Rm + δ(ǫ)). (14)
Proof: This lemma can be proved using similar methods in
existing related works, such as [13] (proof of Lemma 22.3) and
[14], with some necessary variations. The details are omitted
here due to space limitation.
Combining (10) with (11), (12), (13) and (14), we have
1
n
I(KA;F
q, Xnm|C) ≤
1
n
I(KA;Wm|C) + ǫ1
≤ δ(ǫ) + ǫ1 − ǫ. (15)
So the private key rate Rkey =
∑M−1
i I(i) − ǫ is achievable.
B. Proof of Converse
The calculation of the upper bound is based on M symmetric
enhanced channels. For the m-th enhanced source model, m =
1, · · · ,M , we only consider the secrecy constraint on relay
m, and ignore the secrecy constraints on all the other relays.
Moreover, Alice and Bob are assumed to know the observations
of two subsets of relays a priori, respectively. The definitions
of the two subsets are given as follows.
For a given m ∈ {1, · · · ,M}, we will form two sets
of nodes, i.e., A]m[ and B]m[ in the next. First, allocate
Alice and Bob to A]m[ and B]m[, respectively. Second, for
relay i, i 6= m, if I(YA,i;Yi,A) > I(YB,i;Yi,B), allocate it
to A]m[; otherwise, allocate it to B]m[. So I(YB,i;Yi,B) =
min{I(YA,i;Yi,A), I(YB,i;Yi,B)} if relay i lies in A]m[, and
I(YA,i;Yi,A) = min{I(YA,i;Yi,A), I(YB,i;Yi,B)} if relay i
lies in B]m[.
Then, assume without loss of generality that relays A1,
A2, · · · , Aj are allocated to A]m[, and relays B1, B2,
· · · , BM−1−j are allocated to B]m[, 0 ≤ j ≤ M −
11. Here {A1, · · · , Aj}
⋂
{B1, · · · , BM−1−j} = ∅ and
{A1, · · · , Aj}
⋃
{B1, · · · , BM−1−j} = {1, · · · ,m − 1,m +
1, · · · ,M}. In other words, A]m[ = {Alice, relays A1, · · · ,
Aj}; B]m[ ={Bob, relays B1, · · · , BM−1−j}. Now, by the
max-flow principle [1], the max follow between the two sets
A]m[ and B]m[ can be expressed as
∑m
i=1 Ii − Im, which is
the upper bound of the m-th enhanced channel. Due to space
limitation, the details are omitted here.
Choosing the smallest bounds among all the M enhanced
channels, we can obtain CK ≤
∑M
i=1 Ii−maxm∈{1,··· ,M} Im.
IV. KEY GENERATION IN WIRELESS NETWORK
In this section, we will extend the RB-based algorithm
proposed for the PIN model into the wireless network, and use
the estimates of wireless fading channels as source observations
for private key generation.
A. Model
The considered wireless network can be viewed as a practical
example of the PIN model in Section II. All the nodes have a
single antenna and are half-duplex constrained. In this wireless
network, it is assumed that there is no direct link between
Alice and Bob, since they are located far from each other.
Denote hA,i (hB,i) as the fading channel gains between relay
i and Alice (Bob). All channels are assumed to be reciprocal.
It is reasonable to assume that all the fading channel gains
and noise are random variables and independent of each other.
An ergodic block fading model is considered, in which all the
channel gains remain constant for a block of T symbols and
change randomly to other independent values after the current
block. For simplicity, we assume hA,i ∼ N (0, δA,i), hB,i ∼
N (0, δB,i). Moreover, none of the nodes knows the values of
hA,i and hB,i a priori, but all the nodes know their statistics.
Assume that terminals transmit in a time-division manner.
For L channel uses, let Si = [si(1), · · · , si(Li)]T , SA =
[sA(1), · · · , sA(LA)]T and SB = [sB(1), · · · , sB(LB)]T de-
note the signals sent by relay i, Alice and Bob, respectively,
where i = 1, · · · ,M , and LA + LB +
∑M
i=1 Li = L. For
simplicity, we consider an equal power constraint for the
legitimate terminals, that is
1
Li
E{STi Si},
1
LA
E{STASA},
1
LB
E{STBSB} ≤ P. (16)
B. Proposed RB-based Algorithm
The proposed RB-based algorithm (Algorithm 1) can be
extended to wireless networks for private key generation.
Briefly speaking, all the relays, Alice and Bob take turns to
broadcast training sequences. After the channel estimation step,
Alice and Bob will generate the private key using the RB-based
scheme in Algorithm 1 (Section III). Now, we will explain the
1If j = 0, {A1, · · · , Aj} = ∅ and A]m[ = {Alice}; if j = M − 1,
{B1, · · · , BM−1−j} = ∅ and B]m[ = {Bob}.
5channel estimation step in more detail. Fig. 3 shows the time
frame for the training of the proposed scheme in each fading
block. Each fading block is divided into M +2 time slots, and
the numbers of symbols in these time slots are T1, · · · , TM ,
TA, TB, respectively, where TA+TB+
∑M
i=1 TM = T . Suppose
relay i, Alice and Bob sends known training sequences Si
of size 1 × Ti, SA of size 1 × TA and SB of size 1 × TB,
respectively. The energy of each sequence is ||Si||2 = TiP ,
||SA||2 = TAP , ||SB||2 = TBP , where || · || denotes the
Euclidean norm.
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Fig. 3. Time frame for the training phase in each fading block.
From n fading blocks, Alice can obtain the estimates
(h˜n1,A, · · · , h˜
n
M,A); Bob can obtain the estimates
(h˜n1,B, · · · , h˜
n
M,B); relay i can obtain the estimates
(h˜nA,i, h˜
n
B,i), i = 1, · · · ,M . These estimates are noisy
versions of the corresponding fading channels. The details of
this channel estimation step are omitted here due to space
limitation, and similar works can be found in [11], [12]. The
rate of each pairwise key Wα,i can be calculated as
RGα,i =
1
2
log
(
1 +
TiTαP
2δ4α,i
δ4 + (Ti + Tα)δ2δ2α,iP
)
,
∀α ∈ {A,B}, i ∈ {1, · · · ,M}, (17)
where δ2 is the variance of each Gaussian noise.
Now, using the result in Theorem 1, the proposed RB-based
algorithm achieves the private key rate RGkey for some tuple
(TA, TB, T1, · · · , TM ), which can be written as
RGkey =
1
T
(
M∑
i=1
IGi − max
i∈{1,··· ,M}
IGi
)
, (18)
with IGi = min{RGA,i, RGB,i}. To further show the impact of the
proposed scheme on the gain of the key rate, the multiplexing
gain (introduced in [11]) is analyzed as following.
Corollary 3: For the considered wireless network with M
relays, the multiplexing gain of the private key rate achieved
by the proposed RB-based algorithm is M − 1.
Proof: Based on the definition of in [11], the multiplexing
gain of the proposed algorithm should be limP→∞
RGkey
Rs
, where
Rs ≈
1
2T logP as P →∞. From Eq. (17), it is easy to obtain
that limP→∞
RGα,i
Rs
= T , so we have limP→∞
RGkey
Rs
= M − 1.
Remark 2: If there is no secrecy constraints at the relays,
the multiplexing gain is M [11]. So the proposed RB-based
algorithm sacrifices one multiplexing gain for satisfying the
secrecy constraints at all the M relays. This loss is insignificant
because only one multiplexing gain is sacrificed, no matter
how large M is. But for the XOR-based algorithm in [11]
(Corollary 10), its multiplexing gain is ⌊M/2⌋ if there does
exist the direct link between Alice and Bob. Therefore this
existing scheme suffers a loss of M/2 multiplexing gain in
comparison with the case without secrecy constraints at the
relays. Hence the proposed RB-based scheme can effectively
enhance the performance of the private key generation.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have investigated the problem of private
key generation. A particular cooperative PIN model with M+2
terminals is considered, where Alice, Bob and M relays
observe pairwise independent sources. Under the help of relays,
Alice and Bob wish to establish a private key that is secure
from Eve and all relays. The private key capacity of this
PIN model has been found. The achievability is proved via
a novel RB-based algorithm for generating the private key.
The upper bound of the private key capacity is obtained by
considering M enhanced source models. Then, we further
consider a cooperative wireless network, in which estimates
of wireless channels are regarded as the correlative source
observations. Compared to the XOR-based algorithm in [11]
whose multiplexing gain is ⌊M⌋/2, the proposed RB-based
algorithm achieves a larger multiplexing gain M − 1.
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